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Forthcoming in 82 Modern Law Review (2019) 
 
Boško Tripković, The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017, 272 pp, hb £60.00. 
 
Courts, no doubt, can get moral answers wrong, but can they also get morality itself wrong? 
This is the ambitious question asked by Boško Tripković in The Metaethics of Constitutional 
Adjudication (MeCA, 8). This book aims to elucidate the use of ethical or moral arguments1 in 
constitutional reasoning by searching for their metaethical foundations. The first part identifies 
and analyses three ethical reasoning ideal-types from a comparative constitutional perspective. 
These ideal-types are arguments from constitutional identity (Chapter 2), common sentiment 
(Chapter 3) and universal reason (Chapter 4). In constitutional adjudication, these types of 
ethical argument are often construed as self-standing methods of ethical argument, as this book 
demonstrates with reference to several jurisdictions including the United States, South Africa 
																																								 																				
* Lecturer in European Law, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen. I am thankful to Sara Bertotti, Dimitry 
Kochenov, Harry Panagopulos, Paul Roberts, Bart Wolbers and an anonymous MLR referee, for valuable 
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 In favouring the term ‘ethical argument’, the book follows P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the 
Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 1982), but the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are used interchangeably, as justified at 
MeCA, 5, fn 5. Any possible distinctions between the two are not relevant for our purposes. 
2	
	
and Israel. Tripković attempts to show how all three ideal-types lack a credible metaethical 
foundation. 
In the second part, Tripković develops his own metaethical theory, drawing particularly 
from evolutionary ethics. This theory is based on the contingency of our ethical beliefs, and 
locates the metaethical foundation of value in the interaction between confidence in our firmly 
held beliefs and our critical reflection upon them (Chapter 5). The final chapter applies this 
metaethical theory to constitutional adjudication to show how confidence and reflection can 
serve as a basis of a theory of constitutional ethics (Chapter 6). 
The book’s approach is original and thought-provoking. Metaethics is likely to be 
unfamiliar ground for most lawyers, and may appear so abstract that its relevance for 
constitutional law practice is obscure. Tripković succeeds in demonstrating that metaethics does 
matter: different conceptions of what ‘counts as’ morality are likely to affect substantive 
outcomes in concrete cases. As I aim to show in this review, however, MeCA’s categorisation 
of ethical argument at times seems crudely reductive, deploying an unrealistic benchmark of 
‘timeless and mind-independent moral facts’. MeCA’s own metaethical theory is not entirely 
convincing, as it is so infused with normative reasoning that it fails to ‘climb outside of 
morality’.2  
In what follows, I first introduce the main aims of the book and situate its project in related 
literature. Then, to better grasp Tripković’s metaethical arguments, I briefly discuss the 
relationship between the concepts of ‘moral realism’, ‘mind-independency’ and ‘objectivity’. 
Thirdly, I critically review the three ideal-types of ethical argument discussed by Tripković. 
Lastly, I discuss the book’s metaethical claims – questioning whether they are genuinely 
																																								 																				
2 Cf R. Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’ (1996) 25 Philosophy & Public Affairs 87, 128 
(remarking that ‘we cannot climb outside of morality to judge it from some external Archimedean tribunal, any 
more than we can climb out of reason itself to test it from above’). 
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metaethical – and how the central notions of confidence and reflection apply in the context of 
constitutional ethics. 
 
METAETHICS AND LEGAL REASONING 
 
This book’s main contribution to the intersection between law and morality is its metaethical 
perspective. Tripković wants to assess ethical argument in constitutional reasoning in light of 
the question of what morality itself is. In doing so, the book deviates from most existing work 
on the relationship between law, constitutionalism and morality, which can be divided roughly 
into two approaches. One is the well-known debate in general jurisprudence on the question of 
the separability of law and morality,3 which has developed into highly abstract discussions on 
whether criteria for legal validity include moral facts,4 and whether the concept of law can be 
understood without moral appraisal.5 Metaethics is largely absent from this current strand of 
legal-philosophical discussion.6 A second approach located in constitutional theory is less 
preoccupied with abstract conceptual questions and instead focuses on moral features of 
																																								 																				
3 Often taking as its starting point J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1998 [1832]); and H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard LR 593. 
4 See S.J. Shapiro, ‘The Hart/Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed’ in A. Ripstein (ed), Ronald 
Dworkin (Cambridge: CUP, 2012). 
5 B. Leiter, ‘Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: the Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence’ in Naturalizing 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: OUP, 2007); J. Finnis, Natural Law And Natural Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 
ch 1. 
6 See however D. Plunkett, S.J. Shapiro and K. Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics 
and Jurisprudence (Oxford: OUP, 2019). 
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constitutional law and legal theory,7 such as the virtues of constitutional pluralism.8 This 
approach typically disregards both metaethics and general jurisprudence as its legal equivalent. 
In contrast, MeCA purports to offer a foundational, rather than normative, analysis of 
ethical argument in constitutional reasoning. Abstract as this analysis necessarily is, it is clearly 
relevant for the practice and legitimacy of constitutional adjudication, as a simple example 
demonstrates. In Pretty v United Kingdom,9 the European Court of Human Rights had to rule 
on the compatibility of section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, criminalising assisted suicide, with 
Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This assessment is 
premised on certain metaethical considerations as to what facts are relevant in moral reasoning. 
The ethical content of Ms Pretty’s human rights might be sought, for example, in the ECHR’s 
constitutional identity, i.e. its scheme of moral principle. When constitutional identity is silent 
or question-begging, one might instead locate the ethical content of human rights in common 
moral sentiment. Lastly, one might argue that the ethical content of Ms Pretty’s rights is to be 
found beyond the specific ECHR context, with the benefit of greater detachment from culturally 
contingent value-choices, by examining assisted suicide regulation in a variety of foreign 
jurisdictions. The appropriate choice depends on one’s conception of morality itself, i.e. what 
facts – if any – determine moral content. MeCA sets out to scrutinise whether any ideal-type of 
ethical argument is grounded in a sufficiently robust theory of metaethics. 
																																								 																				
7 Recently eg J. Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2016); D. Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford: OUP, 2016); A. Sajó 
and R. Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 2017); P. Eleftheriadis, ‘In Defence of Constitutional 
Law’ (2018) 81 MLR 154. 
8 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 317; M. Kumm, ‘The Moral Point of 
Constitutional Pluralism’ in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
9 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
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 Philosophical debates on metaethics have grown exponentially in recent decades, 
producing a semantic minefield. We can distinguish cognitivist from non-cognitivist,10 
naturalist from non-naturalist theories of morality;11 and partly within those categories among 
others between moral realism,12 emotivism13 and error theory.14 MeCA does not focus on 
traditional theories of metaethics as such. Rather, in Chapters 2–4 Tripković considers how 
three distinctive types of ethical argument – constitutional identity, common sentiment and 
universal reason – succeed in reflecting objective, timeless and mind-independent moral truths. 
Having argued that all three types of ethical argument lack credible metaethical foundations, 
Chapter 5 purports to set out a metaethical theory based on the premise that morality is probably 
mind-dependent and contingent. Structurally, it might have made more sense to have addressed 
the metaethical debate first, so that the three ethical argument-types could be assessed against 
a more nuanced benchmark. In fact, the critique developed in Chapters 2 to 4 is largely based 
on elements drawn from Tripković’s own theory, in particular his anti-realist metaethics and 
the notion of reflection, which are introduced in detail only in Chapter 5. Before addressing this 
thesis directly, a short detour into the concepts of ‘realism’, ‘mind-(in)dependency’ and 
‘objectivity’ will facilitate richer understanding of MeCA’s main claims. 
 
MIND-INDEPENDENCY AND OBJECTIVITY IN ETHICS 
																																								 																				
10 Cognitivist theories of morality hold that moral claims are propositions capable of being true or false (ie that 
they are ‘truth-apt’), while non-cognitivist theories deny this. 
11 Naturalist theories state that moral claims are reducible to facts about the natural world. Non-naturalists deny 
this connection, claiming that moral facts are autonomous from facts about the natural world.  
12 Moral realism holds that at least some moral claims are actually true: eg G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1903). 
13 Emotivism states that moral claims reflect emotional attitudes that are not truth-apt: eg J. Ayer, Language, Truth 
and Logic (London: Gollancz, 1936). 
14 Error theory states that moral claims are simply based on a mistake because morality does not really exist: eg 




MeCA’s metaethical benchmark is the concept of ‘mind-independency’: the idea that moral 
judgments ‘could be true irrespective of our contingent attitudes’ (144). It is not entirely clear, 
however, what it means for a moral judgment to be ‘true’ irrespective of our ‘contingent 
attitudes’. Does it imply, for example, that the fact that almost all people today consider slavery  
immoral is irrelevant to slavery being immoral? By extension, does it entail that slavery was 
always immoral, a judgement as valid as the laws of physics, no matter how widespread the 
belief that it was a natural phenomenon in earlier times? Rather than delving deeper into these 
philosophical complexities, MeCA conflates the concepts of ‘objective truth’, ‘(moral) realism’ 
and ‘mind-independency’. 
Most people equate ‘objectivity’ with metaphysical objectivity. For some statement to 
be metaphysically objective, its correctness must depend on the existence of an object in the 
world which has properties corresponding to the statement.15 Objectivity thus entails that the 
correctness of the statement is not determined by ‘what seems correct’ as a matter of subjective 
assessment.16 Appearances may be deceptive, and even a consensus among minds might be 
mistaken. Yet, contrary to MeCA’s suggestion, the connection between objectivity and mind-
independency is not obvious. Countless objects which we consider to exist objectively are 
socially constructed, and thus mind-dependent at least to some degree; think of ‘fashion’, 
‘nation-states’ or ‘inflation’. 
Coleman and Leiter propose a helpful distinction between strong, modest and minimal 
objectivity. This distinction elucidates the different ways in which we speak about objectivity, 
and has particular relevance for MeCA’s thesis. Strong objectivity divorces objective reality 
																																								 																				
15 A. Marmor, ‘Three Concepts of Objectivity’ in Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford: OUP, 2001) 116–
119. 
16 See J.L. Coleman and B. Leiter, ‘Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority’ in A. Marmor (ed), Law and 
Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 1995) 252–256. 
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from human thought.17 It is closely related to mind-independency and metaphysical realism, 
positing an objective reality independently of human thought and perceptions.18 At the other 
end of the scale, minimal objectivity locates objectivity in conventional, community standards 
of correctness (ie, it is not dependent on any individual’s mind).19 Borrowing Coleman and 
Leiter’s example, fashion is objective in this minimal sense. Something  is ‘fashionable’ only 
by virtue of the objective fact that the majority of persons (perhaps following some recognised 
authority) in a community recognises it as fashionable, and not just because I say so.20 Lastly, 
modest objectivity is indexed to epistemically ideal conditions.21 Colours, for example, are 
modestly objective because what is objectively blue corresponds to what humans perceive as 
blue in epistemically ideal conditions: observations should be made in white light, the subject 
should have unimpaired vision, etc.22 Neither minimal nor modest objectivity presupposes 
metaphysical realism or mind-independency in a strong sense.  
As applied to moral facts, strong objectivity would entail that moral facts exist 
independently of what humans think about what morality is or requires. Minimal and modest 
objectivity about morality only require, respectively, that there should be conventional 
agreement within a community about the content of morality, or that morality be determined 
by moral reasoning in epistemically ideal conditions. Beliefs in the contingency of morality and 
value pluralism among communities (for example) are fully consistent with a metaethically 
sophisticated understanding of moral objectivity.23 
																																								 																				
17 ibid, 252. 
18 Marmor, n 15 above, 116, referring to M. Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy (London: 
Duckworth, 1981) 434. However, not all moral realists are committed to mind-independence of moral facts, eg D 
Copp,	Morality, Normativity, and Society (Oxford: OUP, 1995). 
19 Coleman and Leiter, n 16 above, 253. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid, 263–264. 
22 ibid, 266. 
23 For a masterful exposition, see I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: Pimlico, 2003). 
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Tripković’s conflation of mind-independency, realism and objectivity at times leads him 
to misconstrue the metaethical foundations of ethical arguments.24 By consistently focusing on 
‘mind-independency’ as the only benchmark, MeCA also overlooks contemporary metatethical 
debates. Although questions about the degree of objectivity of ethical arguments barely surface 
in MeCA’s analysis, the character of objectivity is an important (implicit) factor in the 
persuasiveness of judicial reasoning, as reflected in Tripković’s three ideal-types. 
 




Constitutional identity might be the most commonly employed variant of ethical reasoning by 
courts. MeCA distinguishes between ‘particular constitutional identity’ – the specific identity 
which underlies the constitutional fabric of a particular community – and ‘general constitutional 
identity’, which refers to a particular set of values or principles with wider application (50–56). 
Examples of particular constitutional identity include the right to bear arms under the US 
constitution,25 or the principle of laïcité in France.26 These principles are inherent to their 
respective communities’ constitutional identities, but do not necessarily have universal 
aspirations. In contrast, ‘general constitutional identity’ refers to concepts endorsed sufficiently 
broadly to be essential to any liberal constitution, for instance the rule of law, democracy and 
																																								 																				
24 For example, Tripković mistakenly attributes to Dworkin a ‘robust version of moral realism: a belief that there 
are mind-independent, universal and timeless moral answers’ (7, fn 7). Dworkin rather ridiculed such moral 
realism, sarcastically referring to ‘moral particles’ or ‘morons’, while he certainly believed in moral objectivity: 
eg Dworkin, n 2 above, 104–105, 128. 
25 Second Amendment to the US Constitution (1791). 
26 Constitution of the French Republic (1958), Art. 1. 
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human rights protection (54).27 Tripković concludes that particular and general constitutional 
identity alike fail to serve as self-standing foundations for ethical reasoning, basically for two 
reasons. First, both are typically too indeterminate to produce concrete ethical answers to 
concrete questions. Secondly, it is unclear what generates their asserted normative force.  
Regarding particular constitutional identity, the problem of indeterminacy reveals itself 
in the distinction between constitutional identity and common sentiment. As Tripković shows, 
courts often juxtapose the former with the latter to prevent constitutional identity from 
collapsing into the common sentiment of the day (50–52). To use a different example, the fact 
that in 2008, 51% of US citizens favoured stricter gun control,28 did not (morally or legally) 
prevent the US Supreme Court from striking down Washington DC’s ban on handguns and the 
requirement that rifles and shotguns be kept ‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger 
lock’.29 Particular constitutional identity is often substantively indeterminate and its 
implications for individual cases are debateable (50–53, 57). More fundamentally, 
constitutional identity as such does not explain why we should favour constitutional identity 
over common emotional sentiment in abstract terms:  
 
[I]t is then neither clear what generates the normativity of the descriptive social and 
psychological facts that constitute particular constitutional identity, nor why we should 
give priority to evaluative attitudes attached to constitutional identity as opposed to current 
moral sentiments (14). 
 
Appeals to constitutional identity indeed resist contigent community moral sentiment. 
Deference to constitutional identity boils down to deference to past generations, expressed in 
																																								 																				
27 See also Weinrib, n 6. 
28 https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx.  
29 District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570 (2008). 
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written constitutions or jurisprudence (or both).30 Thus, the normative premise of constitutional 
identity as an ethical argument is that the collective wisdom of previous generations merits the 
moral authority to determine current legal controversies. 
This premise may well be wrong.31 For example, the US constitution has been (and to 
some extent, continues to be) ‘a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell’, according to 
Jack Balkin.32 Previous generations have been convinced of the moral authority of the US 
constitution to allow for segregated schools,33 the prohibition of abortion34 and discriminatory 
sodomy laws.35 While the problem of constitutional evil is perhaps not as pressing in all 
jurisdictions as it is in the US, similar ethical conundrums are ubiquitous. In the UK, for 
instance, the ethical credentials of the common law constitution are questionable insofar as it 
prioritises property and contractual rights over race and gender equality.36 Locating the ethical 
content of rights in constitutional identity rather than moral sentiment, then, has tangible 
implications for the content of common law rights. As for EU constitutionalism, recent 
scholarship has questioned whether the EU’s constitutional identity lives up to its foundational 
																																								 																				
30 Parallels may be drawn with debates on the normative force of ‘originalist’ constitutional interpretation: see A. 
Marmor, ‘Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2013) 82 Fordham LR 577; L.B. Solum, 
‘Originalism, Hermeneutics, and the Fixation Thesis’ in BG Slocum (ed), The Nature of Legal Interpretation 
(Chicago, IL: U Chi Press, 2017). 
31 See also J. Waldron, ‘Particular Values and Critical Morality’ (1989) 77 California LR 561.  
32 J.M. Balkin, ‘Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith’ (1997) 65 Fordham LR 1703. 
33 R. Kluger, Simple Justice: the History of Brown v Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 
(New York, NY: Knopf, 1976). 
34 L.J. Reagan, When Abortion Was a Crime Women, Medicine, and Law in the United States, 1867–1973 
(Oakland, CA: UC Press, 1998). 
35 W.N. Eskridge Jr, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1999). See eg 
Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986), overturned by Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). 
36 C. Gearty, On Fantasy Island: Britain, Europe, and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2016). Cf T.R.S. Allan, 
‘Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: the Human Rights Act in Constitutional Perspective’ 
(2006) 59 CLP 27. 
11	
	
values,37 and the challenged the legitimacy of its political messianism.38 Notable examples 
include the fact that the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of EU citizenship does not 
guarantee equal rights for all EU citizens,39 often to the detriment of the less cosmopolitan,40 
the manner in which EU law economically benefits the older Member States at its centre to the 
detriment of the newer Member States at the periphery,41 and generally, the core of the EU’s 
constitutional identity arguably being rife with systemic moral weakness.42 Even if not 
inherently immoral, constitutional identity can be abused in constitutional reasoning. Consider 
Hungary and Poland’s ‘illiberal democracy’ programmes, in which democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental rights protection are systematically undermined by governmental, as well as 
judicial, appeals to constitutional identity.43 
																																								 																				
37 In particular Arts. 1 and 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 
38 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy and the Political Messianism of 
European Integration’ (2012) 34 Journal of European Integration 825. 
39 Eg E. Spaventa, ‘Earned Citizenship: Understanding Union Citizenship Through its Scope’ in D. Kochenov 
(ed), EU Citizenship and Federalism: the Role of Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2017); C. O’Brien, Unity in Adversity 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017).  
40 The applicability of EU fundamental rights generally requires a ‘cross-border element’, which arguably entails 
morally questionable outcomes in family reunification cases; compare eg Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-
6279 with Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375. The same applies to the economic activity and self-
sufficiency thresholds, see Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925 compared to Case C-86/12 Alokpa 
and Moudoulou EU:C:2013:645. 
41 D. Kukovec, ‘Hierarchies as Law’ (2014) 21 CJEL 131. 
42 M.A. Wilkinson, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the European Union’ (2013) 76 MLR 191; A.J. Menéndez, 
‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’ (2013) 14 German LJ 453; D. Kochenov, G. de Búrca and A. 
Williams (eds), Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
43 G. Halmai, ‘National(ist) Constitutional Identity? Hungary’s Road to Abuse Constitutional Pluralism’ (2017) 
EUI Working Papers LAW 2017/08; T.T. Koncewicz, ‘Of Institutions, Democracy, Constitutional Self-defence 
and the Rule of Law: the Judgments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Cases K 34/15, K 35/15 and Beyond’ 
(2016) 53 CML Rev 1753. 
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Overall, Tripković’s scepticism concerning whether constitutional identity deserves our 
fidelity44 seems warranted. However, it is doubtful whether any normative theory of 
constitutional ethics (including Tripković’s own) could satisfy his benchmark, requiring mind-
independent, timeless moral truths. MeCA’s analysis would have been more persuasive if based 
on more nuanced metaethical theorising. The status of moral realism cannot settle other 
metatethical questions, such as whether the argument from constitutional identity could be 
minimally or moderately objective. Some elements of the liberal constitutional tradition, for 
example, may reflect values which seem valid under epistemically ideal conditions irrespective 
of cultural or historical contingencies.45 This objective core of constitutionalism could plausibly 
include the basic properties of the formal rule of law and elementary human rights, such as the 




The argument from common (emotional) sentiment ‘holds that moral sentiments of the people 
in a particular community constitute the right solution to moral problems … It looks at existing 
moral feelings, internal dispositions and psychological tendencies’ (59). Tripković illustrates 
this second ideal-type with Justice Stevens’ opinion in Spaziano,46 addressing the 
constitutionality of a Florida law empowering judges to override juries’ sentencing decisions. 
Spaziano was found guilty of first-degree murder. The jury proposed a sentence of life 
imprisonment, but the trial court instead sentenced him to death. Justice Stevens concluded that 
																																								 																				
44 See also J.M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014); M. Loughlin, ‘The 
Constitutional Imagination’ (2015) 78 MLR 1. 
45 In elucidating ‘epistemically ideal conditions’, Habermas’ ideal speech situation could be a viable starting point: 
see J. Habermas, ‘Wahrheitstheorien’ in H. Fahrenbach (ed), Wirklichkeit und Reflexion (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1973). 
46 Spaziano v Florida, 468 US 447 (1984). 
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state law was unconstitutional, given that imposing the death penalty rests ultimately on an 
ethical judgement:  
 
[I]f the decision that capital punishment is the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is 
justified because it expresses the community’s moral sensibility… it follows, I believe, 
that a representative cross-section of the community must be given the responsibility for 
making that decision.47 
 
Tripković treats the argument from common sentiment as a stand-alone ethical argument (59–
60). The appeal to emotional sentiments in Spaziano, however, was deeply rooted in 
constitutional identity, and implicated questions of institutional competence and governmental 
legitimacy. In other words, the argument from common sentiment in Spaziano can hardly be 
separated from the constitutional tradition of jury trial. 
The same objection extends to the ‘shocks the conscience’ test in Canadian 
constitutional law, which MeCA invokes as another example of common sentiment (72–76). 
This test is applied to determine whether extradition of a person to another country for trial 
breaches ‘principles of fundamental justice’.48 According to the Canadian Supreme Court, it 
would do so when the nature of foreign criminal procedures or penalties ‘shocks the 
conscience’.49 From Tripković’s subsequent elaboration, however, it becomes apparent that the 
‘shocks the conscience’ test refers, not to current moral sentiments, but rather to an abstract 
‘conscience of Canadians’, the ‘public values of the community’, and the ‘Canadian sense of 
																																								 																				
47 ibid 481 (Stevens), cited in MeCA, 66. 
48 MeCA, 72–73; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7. 
49 Canada v Schmidt [1987] 1 SCR 500, para 47, cited in MeCA, 73. 
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what is fair, right and just’ (74). The test, in other words, channels constitutional identity rather 
than common sentiments.50 
The interaction between constitutional identity and emotional sentiment is further 
illustrated by the European Court of Human Rights’ Handyside judgment, in which the 
applicant had been convicted under the Obscene Publications Acts 1959 and 1964 for 
publishing a schoolbook with sexual content and complained, unsuccessfully, that his freedom 
of expression had been violated. For Tripković, Handyside demonstrates that a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ is conceded to contracting states because ‘the requirements of morals [vary] from 
time to time and from place to place’ and ‘by reason of their direct and continuous contact with 
the vital forces of their countries’,51 state authorities are better placed to assess the scope of 
freedom of expression (68–72). While this passage does express deference to Contracting 
States’ moral judgements, and indeed the Court found no violation of Article 10 in this specific 
case, Tripković ignores the subsequent paragraph declaring that ‘[f]reedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of… society’ and must extend to information and 
ideas that ‘offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population’.52 This key passage 
downplays emotional sentiment and underscores the ECHR’s constitutional identity as the 
primary source of moral content.53  
More generally, it seems plainly wrong, from a rule of law perspective, to say that the 
content of our constitutional rights is derived from emotional sentiment. Prevailing sentiment 
																																								 																				
50 Seemingly acknowledged by MeCA, 74–75, fn 53. 
51 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, [48]. 
52 ibid [49]. 
53 The ECtHR applies the margin of appreciation with varying intensity, which may reflect different conceptions 
of morally salient facts. Cf Lautsi v Italy, (2012) 54 EHRR 3, holding that displaying crucifixes on state 
schoolroom walls does not infringe freedom of religion. From the ECHR perspective, this interpretation arguably 
accommodates common emotional sentiment, although from the perspective of the Italian state the crucifix is part 
of Italy’s constitutional identity; further complicating the connection between ethical argument types. I owe this 
point to Sara Bertotti. 
15	
	
towards, say, paedophiles, murderers or rapists typically does not correspond to the rights they 
possess. Given the durability and counter-majoritarian bias inherent to constitutional rights, 
common sentiment appears unsuitable as a basis of ethical argument in constitutional 
adjudication. By contrast, Tripković’s objection to common sentiment is mainly philosophical, 
drawing on emotivism. However, although emotivism denies the truth or falsity of moral 
claims,54 it does not follow that moral judgements are subjective, as Tripković states (82–83). 
According to emotivism, questions of subjectivity or objectivity simply do not arise.55  
MeCA is critical of judges who claim to apply the common sentiment of the community 
rather than their own, moral sentiments. According to Tripković, these judges talk as if they 
refer to an objective truth, whereas convergent feelings support the mere ‘illusion of objectivity’ 
(87). The ethical status of common sentiment pivots on its ontological status (79). Since there 
is no reason to assume that common sentiments are objective, Tripković argues, judges’ reliance 
on these sentiments in ethical argument cannot be objective either.  
Tripković here mistakenly conflates the objectivity of constitutional ethics with mind-
independency as a metaethical theory. Emotivism and emotional sentiment as metaethical 
theories imply that morality is neither objective nor subjective. Whether common sentiment as 
the basis for constitutional ethics can be objective is a different matter. Since prevailing popular 
sentiment is, at least in principle, a matter of empirical investigation, courts could consult 
objective data on, say, society’s views of the (im)morality of the death penalty in order to decide 
on the latter’s constitutionality. Common sentiments are minimally objective to the extent that 
they are shared by the community as a whole, irrespective of any metaphysical claims to mind-
																																								 																				
54 n 13 above; MeCA, 82. 
55 In other words, emotivism is a non-cognitivist theory of metaethics, while subjectivity about ethics presupposes 




independent moral truths. In other words, objective constitutional ethics and non-cognitivist 
metaethics are perfectly compatible. 
MeCA further presses its metaethical agenda by questioning how descriptive facts about 
contingent moral attitudes gain normative traction (95). According to Tripković, any sense of 
objectivity collapses in the face of moral disagreement, since ‘[t]here is no reflection, reason, 
or process of justification to overcome disagreement, and there is no agreement to maintain the 
illusion of objectivity’ (89). Why disagreement should pose a more serious threat to common 
sentiment than to constitutional identity or universal reason remains unclear. More reflection 
and reasoning do not necessarily promote convergence. Conversely, to the extent that emotional 
sentiments are unreflective and unreasoned products of human nature, they are primed for stable 
convergence.56 Tripković’s ostensibly metaethical argument appears to be an ethical-
constitutional argument in disguise, and one with a reverse teleology: disagreement is a problem 
because it undermines a credible theory of constitutional ethics, not because it would be 
metaethically problematic. The unconstitutionality of emotivist morality remains the foremost 
challenge to judicial reliance on common sentiment, in my opinion, but this argument stands 




The third argument type relies on the idea that ‘morality is universal, or at least more detached 
from particular communal, cultural, or individual experiences’ (97). Tripković conceptualises 
the argument from universal reason in constitutional adjudication as the use of foreign law in 
the interpretation of domestic provisions. This choice is substantiated by reference to the 
																																								 																				
56 As evolutionary ethics, discussed and endorsed by Tripković in ch 5, would also suggest, since evolutionary 
benefits of moral sentiments require convergence within groups. 
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practice of constitutional adjudication and doctrine. While courts are ordinarily ensconced  
within their own self-referential legal orders,57 reference to foreign legal sources indicates an 
aspiration to rationality beyond the local and contingent: 
 
Both case law and academic commentary share the notion that the use of foreign law has 
to do with the idea of reasoned judgment in morally sensitive issues, and that this 
phenomenon depends on a more cosmopolitan understanding of the nature of value (98). 
 
Tripković offers multiple examples, drawn from the United States, South Africa and Israel, 
linking the use of foreign law in domestic constitutional interpretation to a quest for moral truths 
detached from domestic perspectives (99–120). This comparative survey illustrates how courts 
mine foreign law for ethical resources to elucidate moral concepts in domestic legal orders, to 
confirm the ethical merits of their own constitutional identities, or to refine their constitution’s 
moral virtues. 
Still, foreign law is not the only source of universal reason in ethical argument in 
constitutional adjudication, and it is surprising that MeCA so quickly equates them. Direct 
appeals to (universalistic) normative legal or ethical theory are not uncommon in legal 
argument. Theory is even formally recognised as a subsidiary source of international law, 
alongside domestic judicial decisions.58 Another candidate form of universalistic judicial 
reasoning is what Richard Fallon identifies as the search for the ‘real conceptual meaning’ of 
constitutional terms.59 According to this viewpoint, constitutional interpretation should seek to 
																																								 																				
57 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); J. Lindeboom, ‘Why EU Law Claims 
Supremacy’ (2018) 38 OJLS 328. 
58 Art. 38(1)(d) Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, 33 UNTS 993. 
59 R.H. Fallon, ‘The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and its Implications for Theories of Interpretation’ (2015) 82 U 
Chi LR 1235. 
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identify what constitutional provisions really mean rather than being beholden to conventional 
understandings.60 A widely debated example is whether the death penalty is ‘cruel and unusual 
punishment’ contrary to the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution. Historically, the 
framers of the US Constitution plainly did not consider the death penalty cruel and unusual, and 
wider moral debates continue today. Nonetheless, according to theorists propounding objective 
conceptions of real meaning, historical and current social attitudes are both largely irrelevant, 
because in reality the death penalty is a cruel punishment.61 Tripković pre-empts discussion of 
these theories by narrowly equating universal reason with deploying foreign law. 
Within this restricted theoretical framework, Tripković considers two normative 
justifications for treating comparative jurisprudence as a source of robust moral truths.62 
According to the ‘deductive view’, there is a direct connection between foreign law and 
morality or morally correct answers (120–121). This view assumes that ‘moral facts exist in 
reality and can be traced by reasoning, which is supposed to be analogous to the scientific 
method’ (123). Tripković rejects the analogy, since even global ethical convergence ‘may well 
be explained by the shared circumstances of human life and our contingent psychological setup’ 
(123). Convergence does not prove that values are part of the ‘fabric of the universe’ (124), but 
once again objectivity is better disentangled from the language of moral realism. Stable ethical 
convergence may support minimally or modestly objective values without implying mind-
independency. As McDowell notes, convergence might be ‘a mere coincidence of subjectivities 
rather than agreement on a range of truths – the sort of view that would be natural if everyone 
																																								 																				
60 eg R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: the Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1996). 
61 Fallon, n 60 above, 1257–1258; M.D. Greenberg and H. Litman, ‘The Meaning of Original Meaning’ (1998) 86 
Georgetown LJ 569, 603–613. 
62 See also B. Tripković, ‘The Morality of Foreign Law’ (2019) 17 I•CON (forthcoming). 
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came to prefer one flavor of ice cream to any other’.63 Unlike ice cream preferences, however, 
convergence of some ethical stances is also sufficiently substantiated by reasons to warrant the 
status of moral truth. Modest moral objectivity and truth may be claimed for sustained, 
supranational jurisprudential convergence without presupposing naturalistic objectivity or 
metaphysical realism. 
A second justification, dubbed the ‘reflective view’ and said to be more prevalent in 
constitutional practice and academic commentary, posits a more indirect relationship between 
foreign law and moral truth (130–2). Tripković suggests that foreign law affords access to a 
wider range of moral options, offers greater flexibility in deciding ethically sensitive issues, 
and promotes coherence at a global level. In avoiding tunnel vision, a domestic constitutional 
system demonstrates greater maturity by exposing itself to outside influences (132–136). 
Notwithstanding these and other virtues, Tripković concludes that even the reflective view fails 
to explain why descriptive facts about moral practices generate normative validity (140). If there 
is no guarantee that reflection on foreign moral practices will bring us any closer to universal 
timeless truths than contemplating local laws, the reflective view cannot derive normativity 
from foreign law. Notably, the virtues of the reflective view, such as coherence, maturity and 
imagination, that Tripković describes are ethical attributes. However, once the benefits of the 
reflective view are recognised as ‘virtues of good moral judgment’ (130–40), the question of 
how foreign law achieves normative traction is no longer relevant to the argument.64 The 
analysis is already profoundly engaged in normative evaluation and cannot recover the 
standpoint for a sceptical metaethics.  
																																								 																				
63 J. McDowell, ‘Projection and Truth in Ethics’, Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas 
(1988) 8. For analysis, B. Leiter, ‘Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication’ in Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford: 
OUP, 2007). 
64 The warning that these ethical virtues ‘do not guarantee full detachment from the contingent moral experience’ 
(132) surely does not deny all normative force. Such denial, amounting to radical nihilism about normativity, 




CONFIDENCE AND REFLECTION AS METAETHICAL THEORY 
 
After three chapters of critical exposition, MeCA concludes that all three ideal-typical ethical 
arguments lack adequate metaethical foundations and must be rejected. The task for the 
remaining two chapters is to supply constitutional courts with ‘a sound theory of value around 
which their ethical arguments could be constructed’, necessitating further inquiry into ‘the 
nature of value and normative judgment’ (143). 
In setting out to construct a self-standing metaethical theory, Chapter 5 is the most 
abstract in the book. Discussion is premised on the tension between practical and theoretical 
perspectives. In our practical way of reasoning about the right thing to do, the values to which 
we are committed seem undeniably true: no one would deny that torturing babies is wrong, and 
has always been wrong regardless of contingent social attitudes. However, theoretical 
reanalysis brings out the contingency of moral judgements influenced by evolution, history and 
culture. Early in this chapter, Tripković introduces an evolutionary perspective to demonstrate 
that ‘[t]here are good theoretical reasons to believe that values are mind-dependent and 
contingent: in other words, that there are no reasons for action independent from valuing 
attitudes present in our psychological sets’ (152).  
Evolutionary theories explain current ethical values in terms of the evolutionary benefit 
of certain normative capacities and moral emotions.65 Drawing mainly on the work of Allan 
Gibbard and Sharon Street, Tripković illustrates how natural selection rewards coordination 
and altruism within groups (158). According to Street, these evolutionary mechanisms 
thoroughly saturate our moral attitudes, without presupposing any mind-independent moral 
																																								 																				
65 See eg M. Ruse and E.O. Wilson, ‘Moral Philosophy as Applied Science’ (1986) 61 Philosophy 173. 
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truths.66 Biological research into moral behaviour of primates and other animals has identified 
dispositions towards ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ within several non-human species, including fish 
and crows.67 As critics of evolutionary ethics point out, however, these research programmes 
are purely empirical: they do not address the normative nature of morality. Moreover, 
evolutionary ethics merely offers causal explanations for existing moral intuitions and beliefs, 
and this is not metaethical theorising. Translating the evolutionary account into metaethical 
terms might correspond to Mackie’s error theory (moral claims as mistakes) or Ayer’s 
emotivism (moral claims as truth-inapt emotional attitudes).68 
An argument against evolutionary ethics, that Tripković considers but rejects, is that 
even if evolution explains the origin of ethical behaviour, we have further developed our ethical 
thinking through critical reflection (170–3). Although evolutionary explanations seem plausible 
when applied to ethical thinking within small, well-defined groups, morality’s universalistic 
and cosmopolitan elements seem to require another explanation which properly captures their 
normativity. To say that torturing babies is morally wrong surely is very different from saying 
that torturing babies within your own group is wrong but torturing strangers’ babies is 
unproblematic. This point is not just theoretical: fascinating empirical research has shown that 
rival chimpanzee groups can engage in systematic warfare, suggesting that this might be 
adaptive, ie innate, behaviour.69 Insofar as we are evolutionarily disposed to doing both good 
																																								 																				
66 S. Street, ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’ (2006) 127 Philosophical Studies 109, 114. 
67 F. de Waal, Good Natured: the Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1996); S.F. Brosnan and F. de Waal, ‘Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay’ (2003) 425 Nature 297; N.J. 
Raihani, A.S. Grutter and R. Bshary, ‘Punishers Benefit from Third-Party Punishment in Fish’ (2010) 327 Science 
171; S.F. Brosnan and F. de Waal, ‘Fairness in Animals: Where from Here?’ (2012) 25 Social Justice Research 
336. 
68 Mackie, n 14 above; Ayer, n 13 above. 
69 M.L. Wilson et al, ‘Lethal Aggression in Pan Is Better Explained by Adaptive Strategies Than Human Impacts’ 
(2014) 513 Nature 414. For a documentation of the 1974–1978 Gombe Chimpanzee War, see J. Goodall, Through 
a Window: My Thirty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2010). 
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and evil, evolutionary ethics seems incapable of distinguishing which behavioural dispositions 
should count as ethical facts and cannot explain why some of our firmly held moral beliefs seem 
deeply at odds with our evolutionary dispositions. 
Tripković nonetheless believes that evolutionary theories of ethics undermine the 
existence of universal, mind-independent moral truths, leaving no option but to fall back on  
contingent value judgements inescapably severed from the ‘realm of robustly true values’:  
 
what we ought to do (reason from robustly true values) bears no systematic connection 
to what we can do (reason from our own values), hence the ought-talk is completely 
confused as we have no hope of ever willingly doing what we ought to do (173). 
 
This unfortunate conclusion seems to result from the false choice, pervading MeCA, between 
the mind-independent values of moral realism and a moral scepticism resembling error theory: 
when the former is found wanting, we are cast back upon the latter. Diving deeper into 
contemporary metaethics, including variants of non-naturalism and non-cognitivism, might 
have saved Tripković from abandoning all hope for theoretical progress.70 Believing in the 
objectivity of morality does not require commitment to a caricatured moral realism, as presented 
by MeCA.71 
																																								 																				
70 See eg T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: OUP, 1986) (proposing a non-naturalist theory of moral 
objectivity); R. Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003) (advancing non-naturalist 
moral realism); S. Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: OUP, 1993), and A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt 
Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992) (advancing variants of non-cognitivist metaethics). 
71 Eg J. McDowell, ‘Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding’ in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds), 
Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981); Nagel, n 70 above; M.H. Kramer, Moral Realism as a 
Moral Doctrine (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). Also see P. Railton, ‘Moral Realism’ (1986) 95 Philosophical Review 
163, and R. Boyd, ‘How to be a Moral Realist’ in G. Sayre-McCord (ed), Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell UP, 1988) (advancing naturalist moral realism). 
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Regardless, Tripković persists in his aim of liberating theorists from the illusion of 
mind-independent moral truths, claiming that: 
 
instead of hopelessly trying to reach the values that are completely beyond us, we need 
confidence in our existing values, and – in fact – confidence is inescapable because the 
only thing we can do is practically reason from our own values (173–174). 
 
Confidence bolstered by the absence of any practical alternative must be counterbalanced by 
reflection to accommodate the idea that our moral values are contingent and subject to critical 
analysis (174). The assault on mind-independence and moral realism, which demolished the 
three models of ethical argument considered in earlier chapters, applies with equal force to the 
conjunction of confidence and reflection. But Tripković regards the idea of mind-independent 
moral truths itself as poisonous for our confidence in first-order moral judgements:  
 
As long as we believe in the correspondence of our moral attitudes with mind-independent 
truths we are bound to lose confidence in our values; but if we abandon this assumption, 
the practical perspective is not in peril … The reasoning … takes the following form. The 
normative premise is: (P1) to know how to live or what to do, one should grasp mind-
independent normative truths. P1 is then combined with a descriptive premise supplied by 
the theoretical perspective: (P2) we cannot grasp mind-independent normative truths. This 
leads to a normatively unacceptable conclusion: (C) we do not know how to live or what 
to do. Since the conclusion is unacceptable, we drop the first premise (176). 
 
After a long and unfruitful search for metaethical foundations, the solution, apparently, is  
pragmatism. Yet the argument is thoroughly normative: (C) ought to be rejected because it is 
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normatively unacceptable. This looks like full-blown moral reasoning ‘from the inside’72 rather 
than metaethical argument. The suspicion is confirmed by Chapter 5’s concluding remarks, 
where Tripković confronts the enduring nature of conflicts of value, and offers this advice: 
 
It is an illusion to think that a mere realization that absolute truths are beyond our reach 
will prevent radical conflicts of evaluative perspectives … If another evaluative standpoint 
violates the core of our values, we need to ask: is it justified in this particular case to force 
others into our own world view, to impose our own identity on them? …We will then need 
to inquire whether we are practically able to live with the fact that we may be merely 
affirming our own views, and understand how that fits with our other ethical convictions. 
This will be the ultimate test of confidence (188–189). 
 
In elucidating the interaction between confidence and reflection, Tripković has silently moved 
from metaethics to ethical questions of justification. The benchmark of whether we are able to 
live with our views is evidently a moral test.73  
Tripković’s analysis of confidence and reflection appears to operate in similar fashion 
to Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. According to Rawls, moral values become justified through 
a process of reflective deliberation in which we revise our judgements and principles until we 
reach a point where our moral principles and particular judgements cohere.74 Reflective 
equilibrium is metaethically neutral, being compatible with both realist and constructivist 
																																								 																				
72 M.H. Kramer, ‘Working on the Inside: Ronald Dworkin’s Moral Philosophy’ (2013) 73 Analysis 118. Following 
Dworkin, Kramer contends that metaethical theories are first-order moral positions. 
73 Tripković’s claim that ‘absolute truths are beyond our reach’ is also naively self-defeating, since if it were true, 
there would be at least one accessible metaethical truth, viz. that there are no absolutely true (first order) ethical 
claims. 
74 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev edn (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1999) 42–45.  
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theories of morality.75 The metaethical component of  Tripković’s theory (the conclusion that 
there are no mind-independent, timeless moral truths) then drops out of the picture, because – 
like Rawlsian reflective equilibrium – the interaction between confidence and reflection is 
compatible with moral realism.76 It remains to flesh out the nature of ethical commitments 
resulting from this interaction. For example, we could ask whether the confidence/reflection 
dynamic could lead over time to minimally objective moral claims, or whether the process of 
confidence and reflection may be part of the epistemically ideal conditions producing modestly 
objective moral facts. These and similar questions are left unanswered by Tripković. 
A related problem for MeCA’s central thesis is the tension between evolutionary ethics 
and the notion of reflection. Reflection has a central role in Tripković’s account because it 
requires critical attention to the dangers of dogmatism and self-deception. Yet the argument 
from evolutionary ethics downgrades and marginalises reflection, as Tripković recognises: 
 
[M]ost of the people most of the time do not engage in or are not capable of such reflection, 
and so the transformative potential of reflection is limited. There are thus serious doubts 
about the ability of reflection to generate a radical disconnect with evolutionarily affected 
moral attitudes (163). 
 
But how, it might be asked, is reflection even possible in our moral thinking, if that thinking is 
profoundly shaped by stubborn evolutionary forces saturating confidence? Evolutionary 
																																								 																				
75 S. de Maagt, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Objectivity’ (2017) 60 Inquiry 443. For Rawls, ‘[a]part from 
the procedure of constructing principles of justice, there are no moral facts’: J. Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in 
Moral Theory’ (1980) 77 Journal of Philosophy 515, 519. 
76 Cf D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), combining reflective 
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benefits presuppose automatic, intuitive responses,77 rather than the critical reflection central to 
Tripković’s (meta)ethical theory. A further puzzle concerns the extrapolation of evolutionary 
ethics to constitutional adjudication. The constitutional context not only presents the challenge 
of ‘defying evolution’ through reflection (170–173), but also begs the question of cosmopolitan 
morality across large groupings such as states. From an evolutionary perspective, there is no 
reason why a resident of, say, Philadelphia should have particular moral concern for west coast 
Californians whom she does not know and will never meet. Grounding constitutional ethics in 
imagined communities78 is not a promising alternative strategy, if only because fictional 
communities cannot supply empirical support for confidence in moral judgements and do not 
confer evolutionary benefit. 
 
CONFIDENCE AND REFLECTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL ETHICS 
 
MeCA’s final chapter applies metaethical theorising on confidence and reflection to develop a 
theory of constitutional ethics. As Tripković explains, the general argument applicable to 
ordinary moral reasoning requires translation to the special constitutional context: 
 
The identity that courts refer to is not personal but constitutional: it is supposed to be 
attributable to the constitutional community as a whole. Common sentiments are not the 
private feelings of a judge but the dominant sentiments of the public. Reflection 
presupposed by the argument from universal reason is directed at a better self-
																																								 																				
77 See eg J. Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: a Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment’ 
(2001) 108 Psychological Review 814; P. Singer, ‘Ethics and Intuitions’ (2005) 9 Journal of Ethics 331. See also 
E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: the New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1975) 3. 
78 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 
27	
	
understanding and development of the deep moral commitments of the constitutional 
system (193). 
 
Under this model, constitutional ethics frames a set of themes from which to identify the 
specific values of the constitutional system justified from its own practical perspective. Shorn 
of claims to universality or mind-independency, constitutional identity points to the confidence 
we have in our values. Constitutional identity should then be supplemented with arguments 
from common sentiment and universal reason to bring additional content to constitutional 
ethics. Common sentiment, for example, may be relevant to constitutional adjudication insofar 
as it is reflective (200–202). By this Tripković means that while common sentiment is not 
objective, courts may be obligated to accept its existence, ‘but with a dose of skepticism, and 
with a critical and open mind’ (201). Indeed, courts should give effect to common sentiments 
contrary to constitutional identity when  
 
these new sentiments can be ascribed to the community as a whole and … they are a 
consequence of a thoughtful process that did not succumb to initial and pre-reflective 
emotive reactions without thinking them through in an open and flexible process. (202) 
 
The possibility of ethical development through social progress accounts for judicial landmarks 
such as Brown v Board of Education79 and Griswold.80 Less dramatic refinements of the UK’s 
constitutional identity may be visible in the changing intensity of Wednesbury review through 
																																								 																				
79 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954). 
80 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965). 
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‘anxious scrutiny’,81 and recent reinvigoration of common law constitutionalism.82 Arguments 
from universal reason are ascribed a similarly supporting role in judicial reasoning. Constant 
reflection augments confidence in subsisting ethical judgements, whilst critical engagements 
with other constitutional traditions promotes ‘greater self-awareness but also the imaginative 
development of the (collective and political) self’ (205).  
The final part of Chapter 6 considers constitutional dilemmas arising from ethical 
conflicts. Diachronic shifts in moral attitudes occur through time, sometimes producing 
controversies at the level of constitutional interpretation.83 Tripković argues that ‘courts ought 
to give effect to deep and reflective transformations in moral attitudes that are not excessively 
confident’ (210). Referring to Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence v Texas,84 he suggests 
that ‘[a] clear sign that the change is deep enough is that it is not possible to imagine that a 
different conclusion could be justified; some attitudes become so obvious over time to the extent 
that other possibilities seem plainly “wrong”’ (210–211).  
Synchronic disagreements in moral attitudes occur simultaneously, within a single 
community or between communities. They have attracted recent academic attention, mainly in 
the context of the relationship between European Union law and the constitutional law of the 
Member States.85 Framing these interactions within his matrix of confidence and reflection, 
Tripković argues that, even though constitutional courts always reason from their own 
perspective, a reflective attitude is evident in the emerging dialogue among European courts 
																																								 																				
81 See eg R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514. 
82 See eg R (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. Also see A. Perry and A. Tucker, 
‘Top-Down Constitutional Conventions’ (2018) 81 MLR 765. 
83 See eg A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1998); 
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1986); J. Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 
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85 n 8 above. 
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(217). While I am not convinced that dialogue between national constitutional courts and the 
ECJ and the ECtHR is genuinely reflective,86 the idea of reflective dialogue and pluralism 
indeed seems entrenched in modern constitutional theory.87 For synchronic disputes within a 
community, Tripković advocates the perspective of ‘impartial spectator’ from which to reason 
and build on existing constitutional identity. Notwithstanding the equal validity – from a 
reflective viewpoint – of two competing moral attitudes, courts should sometimes fall back on 
their confidence in well-established principles of constitutional identity (214). 
All in all, constitutional identity, as already a product of an enduring process of 
confidence and reflection, is accorded special metaethical status: 
 
[C]onstitutional identity sometimes is the point of intersection between confidence and 
reflection: it embodies the optimal level of attachment and detachment that is appropriate 
for a disenchanted normative perspective (220). 
 
This intriguing conclusion brings Tripković close to the moral and jurisprudential positions of 
Rawls and, especially, Dworkin, notwithstanding their metaethical differences. Dworkin was 
sceptical of metaethics but a firm believer in moral objectivity; Tripković reaffirms the 
foundations of ethical argument in constitutional adjudication while rejecting moral objectivity 
and truth. However, in his theory of law as integrity, Dworkin locates legality in the morally 
best interpretation of past political and judicial decisions.88 His criterion of jurisprudential ‘fit’ 
is mirrored, for Tripković, in the need for confidence in our constitutional identity, as expressed 
by the entire body of past political and judicial practice. Further, integrity can require courts to 
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change course and overturn previous jurisprudence, not unlike the reflective process by which 
entrenched common sentiments or universal reason require divergence from constitutional 
identity. In other words, integrity’s balancing between respecting and regretting past political 
and judicial practice is strikingly similar to the process of balancing confidence in our 
constitutional values and reflection on whether these values remain morally valid.89 If this 
comparison is warranted, it confirms the metaethical neutrality of Tripković’s theory of 
confidence and reflection. Moreover, since normative arguments saturate his metaethical 





MeCA offers an original and thorough analysis of ethical arguments in constitutional 
adjudication and their metaethical foundations. This review article has focussed on the book’s 
most notable assertions and highlighted areas of uncertainty and controversy. It cannot claim to 
do justice to every subplot or refinement of Tripković’s argument. MeCA is not the definitive 
statement of the metaethics of constitutional adjudication. Hopefully, it rather presages a more 
explicit debate on the foundations of ethical argument in constitutional reasoning, the 
importance of which cannot be overstated for constitutional legal theory and practice. Future 
discussion of the ethics and metaethics of constitutional reasoning would benefit from a more 
precise and nuanced account of the metaphysics of morality, further clarifying the nature of 
objectivity in moral argument. MeCA, meanwhile, points the way. 
																																								 																				
89 On ‘respect’ and ‘regret’, see G.J. Postema, ‘Integrity: Justice in Workclothes’ in J. Burley (ed), Dworkin and 
His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
90 Kramer, n 72 above. 
